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Donald Chisholm
The difficulty . . . to be got over is to know how not only to invade with 
success; but likewise to retreat with safety.
THOMAS MORE MOLYNEUX
I kept the sea always on my flank; the transports attended the movements 
of the army as a magazine; and I had at all times, and every day, a short 
and easy communication with them. The army, therefore, could never 
be distressed for provisions or stores, however limited its means of land 
transport; and in case of necessity it might have embarked at any point 
of the coast.
SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY
mphibious operations exploit the great facility and inherent flexibility of 
movement and maneuver that the sea affords in order to concentrate mili-
tary power at the decisive time and place ashore.1 Such operations are founded 
on sea control, regularly capitalize on surprise and enemy weakness, and are 
usually carried out in support of broader operational and campaign objectives 
ashore—severing enemy land lines of communication, establishing lodgments 
for follow-on forces, establishing control of choke points or denying the enemy 
use of decisive physical points, outflanking less mobile 
enemy land forces, and the like. 
We are wont to identify amphibious operations with 
amphibious assaults, especially those executed during 
World War II, when the assault was refined to a high 
art. In truth, however, militaries have for many centu-
ries found it useful to conduct an olio of amphibious 
operations during peace as well as war. Appropriately, 
therefore, in addition to the assault, U.S. joint doctrine 
identifies four other categories of amphibious opera-
tion: raids, demonstrations, withdrawals, and those in 
support of other kinds of operations with objectives 
A
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of conflict prevention or crisis mitigation (e.g., disaster relief and noncomba-
tant evacuations).2 The last type has constituted the majority of amphibious 
operations conducted since World War II. Still, the amphibious assault, as such, 
remains most vivid in the mind’s eye. Notwithstanding Omar Bradley’s 1949 
declaration that atomic weapons had rendered the large-scale amphibious assault 
anachronistic, events of the ensuing decades—famously, Inchon, less than a year 
later—suggest that the practical utility of the amphibious operation neither has 
dimmed nor is likely to do so in the foreseeable future.3 Its successful execution 
still poses the greatest risk to potential and actual enemies, as Argentina learned 
through hard experience in 1982, Saddam Hussein recognized during Operation 
DESERT STORM, and Task Force (TF) 58 demonstrated to the Taliban in Afghani-
stan in November 2001. And now the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps are returning 
their attention to the amphibious assault, after ten years in the desert.4 
The present discussion, however, contemplates the amphibious withdrawal, 
those “operations conducted to extract forces by sea in ships or craft from a hos-
tile or potentially hostile shore.”5 The capability to plan and execute amphibious 
withdrawals, no less than their more glamorous and practiced assault siblings, 
remains a practical essential in the military repertoire. Forces successfully with-
drawn and redeployed will live to fight again another day, and the enemy must 
honor and plan against such a capability. If the amphibious assault against a 
hostile shore is among the most complex, technologically and organizationally, of 
all military undertakings, the amphibious withdrawal does the assault one better
—its execution comes as a “branch,” a contingency, against reversal of fortune, 
thus as reaction rather than proaction. 
History records a great many military situations in which the success or failure 
of amphibious withdrawals of land forces profoundly altered operational and 
strategic outcomes. Arguably, the inability of Cornwallis in 1781 to extract his 
troops at Yorktown led to his surrender and success for the American revolution-
aries. Certainly Lord Wellington thoroughly understood the power this capability 
afforded him during his Peninsular Campaign against Napoleon’s forces. The 
Royal Navy permitted him not only to reinforce by sea at the places and times 
required by the ground situation but also to withdraw troops under pressure. 
He did so on several occasions, most importantly in January 1809 at Vigo and 
Corunna, where nearly thirty thousand British troops were evacuated, thereby 
saving Britain’s only field army, as well as perhaps the government and the war.6
A surprising number of major military extractions from the beach, shown in 
table 1, were executed in the twentieth century.7 In every event, ground forces 
facing destruction by superior enemy strength and position were withdrawn by 
naval forces. All these withdrawals were executed without any doctrinal founda-
tion; some without air or sea superiority; most absent purpose-built amphibious 
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shipping; some over very short distances, some over long; some by command-
ers and staffs inexperienced in amphibious techniques; and others were poorly 
planned, if at all. In some, the withdrawing force suffered significant casualties in 
the process; in most, the bulk of heavy equipment was left behind. In every one, 
however, the amphibious withdrawal permitted the commander to retrieve forces 
a. U.S. Marine and Air Force transport aircraft lifted an additional 3,600 troops, 196 vehicles, and 1,300 tons of cargo from Yongpo Airfield adjacent to 
Hungnam.
Month/Year Location Actor(s) Scale
Dec. 1915–Jan. 1916 Gallipoli, Turkey Britain 140,000 British, Australian, and New 
Zealand troops
Dec. 1915–Feb. 1916 Durazzo/San Giovanni, Albania Serbia, 
Italy
136,000 troops, 36,350 horses
May 1940 Dunkirk, France Britain, 
France
338,000 troops
April 1941 Attica and Peloponnesus, Greece Britain 43,000 troops
Oct. 1941 Odessa USSR 86,000 troops, 150,000 civilians
Dec. 1941 Hangö, Finland USSR 20,000+ troops
Feb. 1943 Guadalcanal Japan 12,000+ troops
Aug. 1943 Sicily, Italy Germany, 
Italy
39,660 German and 62,000 Italian 
troops
Aug. 1943 Sardinia, Italy Germany 25,000 troops, 2,300 vehicles, 5,000 tons
Aug. 1943 Kolombangara, Solomon Islands Japan 9,000 troops
Sept.–Oct. 1943 Sea of Azov, USSR Germany, 
Romania
200,000 troops, 16,000 wounded, 
27,000 civilians, equipment
Sept.–Oct. 1943 Corsica, France Germany 6,250 troops, 1,200 POWs, 3,000+ 
vehicles, 5,000 tons
March 1944 Odessa, USSR Germany 24,300 troops and civilians, 54,000 tons
May 1944 Crimea, USSR Germany 130,000 German and Romanian troops
March 1945 Courland, Latvia Germany 2.2 million troops and civilians
Dec. 1950 Wonsan, Korea United 
States
3,800 troops, 1,146 vehicles, 10,000 
tons, 4,800 civilians
Dec. 1950 Chinnampo, Korea United
States
1,800 U.S. troops, 5,900 ROK troops, 
3,000 refugees 
Dec. 1950 Hungnam, Korea United
States
105,000 U.S. and ROK troops, 91,000 
civilians, 17,500 vehicles, 350,000 tonsa
Dec. 1950–Jan. 1951 Inchon, Korea United
States
4,963 UN troops, 63,220 ROK troops, 
64,200 civilians, 1,404 vehicles, 62,144 
tons
TABLE 1
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otherwise doomed to destruction or captivity and subsequently to reinsert them 
into combat. For this alone, the amphibious withdrawal demands our attention.
Dunkirk and Hungnam represent the antipodes of the twentieth-century 
amphibious withdrawal. Dunkirk in May 1940 amounted to a hurried evacua-
tion, executed under great pressure from the Luftwaffe, by a hasty assemblage of 
British and French naval vessels, augmented by myriad civilian ships and small 
craft. The British Expeditionary Force left behind most of its heavy equipment 
and arms, as well as about forty thousand British soldiers (along with many more 
French). However, the nearly 350,000 troops successfully returned to England, 
when recovered, rearmed, and reequipped, once again confronted the Germans 
in North Africa and Europe.
Conversely, Hungnam constituted a planned, carefully staged massive rede-
ployment of forces against enemy pressure. Most of General Douglas MacArthur’s 
X Corps ground troops—the 1st Marine Division (Reinforced) and the battered 
7th Infantry Division—arrived at and staged off the beach at Hungnam as or-
ganized fighting units. In addition, X Corps’s 3rd Infantry Division moved by 
road and amphibious lift from Wonsan to Hungnam before being redeployed 
south. All these units brought out their fighting equipment and supplies. The 
Marines brought their wounded (many others had already been evacuated by 
air) and virtually all of their dead down the gauntlet from the Chosen Reservoir. 
The Navy immediately treated the wounded and provided the troops with show-
ers and warm food on board ship.8 The Navy also lifted the Republic of Korea 
(ROK) I Corps from Songjin to Hungnam, where it was reembarked and lifted 
to Bokuko Ko. When the U.S. Navy closed out Hungnam on 24 December 1950, 
it destroyed all facilities, leaving behind nothing for advancing enemy forces. 
The Navy also redeployed United Nations (UN) forces from Chinnampo and 
Inchon on the west coast. Thus, during December 1950, the U.S. Navy conducted 
five nearly simultaneous amphibious redeployments from both coasts of Korea. 
The total evolution was remarkably well organized and executed; not a single life 
was lost to enemy action, and material losses were light.9 
Oddly, Hungnam and its associated efforts never worked their way into the 
American mythological consciousness—although, justifiably, the 1st Marine Di-
vision’s epic fighting withdrawal from Chosen to Hamhung did.10 It was, rather, 
the brilliantly conceived and executed landing at Inchon in September 1950—a 
masterstroke that reversed the tide of the Korean War—that immediately cap-
tured the popular imagination and continues to receive the lion’s share of atten-
tion from military historians and the military itself.11
More important, the amphibious withdrawal, generally speaking, has never 
worked its way into U.S. doctrine in a meaningful way. Recognizing the require-
ment for seizing advanced bases in support of War Plan ORANGE, the U.S. Marine 
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Corps in its 1934 Tentative Manual for Landing Operations laid the intellectual 
foundation for the great amphibious assaults of Campaign GRANITE in the Cen-
tral Pacific, General MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific campaign, and the Mediter-
ranean and European campaigns. By war’s conclusion, the amphibious assault, 
even of the magnitude and complexity of that planned for the September 1945 
invasion of Kyushu, largely had been rendered a well-structured problem.12 
Conversely, the Tentative Manual did not contemplate amphibious withdraw-
als. The Navy’s 1938 Manual for Landing Operations, known as FTP-167, provid-
ed doctrinally only for planning and organizing the amphibious assault—ditto 
for the Army’s 1941 Landing Operations on Hostile Shores (FM 31-5); both were 
derived from the Tentative Manual. As it happened, World War II brought no 
such reversals of fortune for U.S. forces. Although it was believed at certain junc-
tures that, the situation being in doubt—notably, in the 1943 operations at Buna 
(New Guinea) and Anzio (Italy)—amphibious extraction might be required, in 
the event it was not, and no practical experience was gained. The extent to which 
narratives of the various World War II withdrawals conducted by other militaries 
then penetrated American military consciousness remains unclear, but it cannot 
have been very great.
We are only slightly better off today. Joint Publication (JP) 3-02, Joint Doc-
trine for Amphibious Operations (its current edition was issued in August 2009), 
recognizes and defines amphibious withdrawal but devotes only two pages, out 
of more than two hundred, to it.13 The subsidiary 1989 JP 3-02.1, Joint Doctrine 
for Landing Force Operations, last updated in 2004, granted the withdrawal 
several more pages, but surprisingly the current (2010) JP 3-02.1, now entitled 
Amphibious Embarkation and Debarkation, fails even to mention withdrawal—
presumably “embarkation” (an aspect of movement) and “withdrawal” (a form 
of maneuver) are to be treated as synonymous. 
Perhaps a certain misplaced optimism now makes it difficult to imagine a 
future situation in which an amphibious withdrawal might be appropriate. This 
would be thin gruel for the commander who confronts the real-world necessity 
for such an operation. Consequently, even though now sixty years in the past, the 
Hungnam redeployment still warrants our careful consideration. It offers endur-
ing lessons with regard to the problem of amphibious withdrawal; to the process 
by which it was conceptualized, planned, and organized; to the practical value 
of sea control to the conduct of land operations; and to effective approaches to 
solving ill-structured military problems.
KOREA IN 1950
The Korean War was a land war, and yet, because of the theater’s geography and 
the state of its communications infrastructure, friendly naval forces played an 
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essential role throughout. The Korean Peninsula, which runs roughly six hundred 
miles north to south, has an east-to-west span of mostly less than two hundred 
miles, leaving few locations more than a hundred miles from the coast. Its area 
totals about eighty-three thousand square miles. The northern part is defended 
by high mountains—a long mountain string isolates a major portion of the east 
coast—and the west is marked by hills and river drainage basins. In 1950, not-
withstanding forty years of Japanese occupation, land communications remained 
difficult at best, with few sealed roads or railroads available to negotiate the dif-
ficult terrain. These few road and rail lines described more or less an X, with its 
intersection at Seoul. Movement north and south, though problematic, was easier 
than east and west.
Militarily usable ports, shown on map 1, then comprised, on the west coast, 
Chinnampo, Inchon, and Kunsan, dominated by the great tidal range of the shal-
low Yellow Sea; on the east were Songjin, Hungnam, Wonsan, and Pusan, with 
deep water just offshore. Sailing distances from major American naval installa-
tions in Japan to Korean ports were short enough to allow quick turnaround; 
even Yokosuka, for example, on Japan’s east coast, lay only 655 sea miles from 
Pusan. Terrain and hydrography afforded additional opportunity and flexibility 
to forces capable of amphibious operations over the beach, as UN forces were. 
In short, the factor of space greatly favored the force able to assert and main-
tain sea and air control, granting it thereby greater freedom of movement and 
maneuver than a land-restricted opponent enjoyed. This essential fact had not 
escaped General MacArthur, who had learned the lesson during World War II 
and subsequently noted, in reference to the Inchon landing, that “deep envelop-
ment, based upon surprise, which severs the enemy’s supply lines is, and always 
has been, the decisive maneuver of warfare.”14 The general also properly under-
stood that naval support secured his own lines of supply and provided the ability 
to hold necessary beachheads more or less indefinitely.
United Nations forces had promptly established sea and air control in the first 
days of the war and effectively exploited it for naval gunfire support, air strikes, 
air-to-ground support, and amphibious lifts and assaults. During the first year 
of the war North Korea and its Russian and Chinese sponsors made few attempts 
at sea denial, but among these, notably, were the extensive sea mining at Wonsan, 
the mining of Hungnam harbor, and the sowing of free-floating mines along the 
east coast.15 The affected ports would play pivotal roles in the war.
THE ROAD TO HUNGNAM
Against this physical backdrop unfolded the events of the first six months of 
the Korean War. North Korean forces attacked across the thirty-eighth parallel 
in the small hours of Sunday, 25 June 1950. Four days later, General Douglas 
6
Naval War College Review, Vol. 65 [2012], No. 2, Art. 8
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss2/8
 C H I S H O L M  111
MAP 1
Field, History of United States Naval Operations.
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MacArthur, Commander, Far East Command, personally visited the active front 
just south of Seoul and concluded that U.S. naval and air support would be insuf-
ficient by themselves to stop the invaders, who were already sweeping aside the 
South Korean defenders. Absent immediate employment of U.S. ground troops, 
the North Koreans would surely overrun the entire peninsula. Piecemeal inser-
tion of small U.S. units by airlift was succeeded by disparate small sealifts from 
Japan as MacArthur sought to buy time in order to mount an amphibious opera-
tion that would lay bare the North Koreans’ lines of communications and enable 
their forces’ envelopment and destruction. Events moved rapidly, however: the 
forces initially designated for a July assault at Inchon landed instead, on 17 July, 
at Pohang Dong, in order to reinforce the fragile Pusan perimeter—enabled by 
friendly sea and air control.
That perimeter held, and with the heroic deployment of the 1st Marine Divi-
sion, speedy assembly of the requisite amphibious shipping over the next two 
months, and organization of X Corps, the general realized his operational vision 
with the 15 September Inchon landing. Although follow-on land operations 
failed to envelop and destroy the North Koreans as intended, the latter’s offensive 
largely culminated, and, mostly no longer fighting in large, organized units, they 
fled north, pursued by Eighth Army units from the Pusan perimeter. 
A second X Corps amphibious landing, this time on the east coast at Wonsan, 
aimed to cut off and complete the destruction of the invaders. Unfortunately, the 
Soviets had anticipated such an assault and had covertly commenced extensive 
mining in late July, the clearance of which delayed landing X Corps, reembarked 
after Inchon. The 1st Marine Division did not land until 26 October, while the 
7th Infantry Division landed instead farther north, at Iwon. By that time the 
ground war had already largely passed north of Wonsan, although guerrilla activ-
ity plagued the mountainous areas just inland.
Meanwhile, an early October United Nations resolution had expanded the 
strategic objective from simply destroying the North Korean army and restoring 
South Korea’s integrity to pacifying North Korea, which for the moment seemed 
entirely possible. The X Corps commander, Major General “Ned” Almond, re-
peatedly urged his subordinate ground commanders to move faster toward the 
northern reaches of Korea in the mountains adjacent to the Yalu River, which 
they did, as did their Eighth Army counterparts in Korea’s west. Almond estab-
lished his headquarters at Hamhung; the Navy cleared and opened the port at 
Hungnam for its support.
The Chinese had other ideas, however. Feeling threatened by the looming pres-
ence of United Nations forces near their border, beginning in late October they 
had secretly started moving vast numbers of ground troops into the mountains 
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of northern Korea. American forces took Chinese prisoners almost immediately. 
However, ambiguity initially obtained as to whether these were individual vol-
unteers or from organized units. All doubt disappeared on 7 November, when 
the 1st Marine Division was hit hard by sizable Chinese units. Nonetheless, each 
succeeding estimate of Chinese strength was obsolete by the time it was pub-
lished: 16,500 on 2 November; 100,000 a week later; 145,000 on the 15th; a range 
of 142,000 to 167,000 on the 23rd.16 In fact, the Chinese had moved across the 
border in even greater numbers than those, and it was now an entirely new war.
On 15 November, in concert with an all-out air effort against the Yalu River 
bridges, MacArthur ordered X Corps to redirect its efforts to the west to assist 
Eighth Army; the Marines were to attack west against the enemy’s line of supply
—apparently on the assumption that they would meet little resistance—while 
other X Corps units moved north along the east coast. On 24 November, having 
opened Chinnampo for naval logistic support, and supported by Fifth Air Force, 
Eighth Army units attacked north from the Chongchon River—II Corps on the 
left, IX Corps in the middle, and the ROK II Corps on the right—with orders to 
link up with X Corps. Shortly, however, Chinese forces counterattacked heavily 
against the ROK II Corps, which broke, exposing the IX Corps right flank. The 
5th and 7th Marine Regiments, by this time nearing the Chosen Reservoir, met 
heavy opposition and on the 27th were struck by two Chinese divisions.
“NO, GENERAL, WE DON’T KNOW HOW TO DO THAT”
The stage was now set for Eighth Army to commence its hasty retrograde move-
ment in the west, while the Marines and fellow X Corps units were to begin their 
fighting withdrawal back to Hungnam.17 Meanwhile, what of the Navy, which 
was cast in a supporting role to the land forces and might very well have to pull 
them all off the beach?
Within a week of the 7 November Chinese attack against the Marines, Vice 
Admiral C. Turner Joy, Commander, Naval Forces Far East, had published his 
Operation Plan 116-50, outlining general procedures for emergency evacuation 
of UN forces from Korea to Japan. It included hydrographic data on Korean 
ports, along with capabilities of available shipping, and it established command 
relations for the redeployment. On 15 November, the commanding general of 1st 
Marine Division, General Oliver P. Smith, conveyed his serious concern about the 
ground situation to the chiefs of staff of Vice Admiral Joy and of Rear Admiral 
James H. Doyle, commander of Amphibious Force, Far East, reinforcing the need 
for contingency plans. Joy, at the prescient recommendation of his deputy chief 
of staff, Rear Admiral Arleigh Burke (who had arrived in Japan in late August), 
began accumulating time-charter shipping in Japan rather than releasing it for 
return to the United States.
9
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As was well known, and had just been proved once again in Korea, the U.S. 
Navy, Marine Corps, and Army were well prepared to make amphibious assaults. 
But they were not so well prepared for extractions. Although veteran amphibious 
professionals all, the commanders and their staffs on the scene in Korea had nei-
ther previous directly comparable practical experience nor specifically applicable 
doctrine to guide their thinking and decision making for Hungnam. Where the 
assault had been rendered a well-structured one by World War II experience, the 
withdrawal remained ill structured.
“Ill structured” problems are distinguished from “well structured” ones by 
the degree to which their boundaries, constituent parts, and the relationships 
among those parts are understood. That is, “ill” and “well structured” refer to the 
fidelity of the decision maker’s representation of the problem to the existential 
problem itself. Well-structured problems are readily recognizable and assign-
able to discrete categories and are therefore directly susceptible of solution by 
computational means—that is, by selection and application of courses of action 
from existing solution sets. The pre–World War II Tentative Manual for Land-
ing Operations had begun the practical structuring of the amphibious assault, 
which was understood to be necessary for acquiring the forward operating bases 
required for the anticipated Pacific campaign against Japan; forces required, 
phases, timing, sequencing, and synchronization were all roughed out. Careful 
assessments of initial wartime amphibious experience refined that structuring: 
shipping requirements, command relations, prelanding bombardment, coordi-
nation of close air support, and hydrographic intelligence were all adjusted. The 
organization of boats for ship-to-shore movement was carefully reworked. By the 
time of the June 1944 Marianas operations, the problems had been so thoroughly 
structured that the plans were confidently executed against more or less alerted 
opposition. 
Conversely, ill-structured problems require decision makers to impose struc-
tures on them and to generate solutions for them—often at the same time. Typi-
cally, ill-structured problems are those that have not been encountered previously 
in quite the same forms and for which no predetermined, explicit sets of ordered 
responses (i.e., doctrines) exist.18 In war, it may be said, each opponent attempts 
to present the other with enough surprise that the problem posed cannot be struc-
tured and made solvable in the time and with the forces available.
Thus, Japan’s systematic employment of thousands of kamikazes and hun-
dreds of Shinyo and Renrakutai surface suicide boats against U.S. naval forces at 
Okinawa for a time rendered ill structured the problem of force protection. The 
practical challenge was simultaneously to figure out the structure of these threats 
and to devise effective methods for dealing with them.19 Out of 1,300 ships in-
volved at Okinawa, assaulted in the teeth of that dual challenge, the “Fleet That 
10
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Came to Stay” sustained thirty-six ships sunk and another 368 damaged, with 
more than 4,900 sailors killed.20
Neither do ill-structured problems remain constant while decision makers 
seek to impose structure on them. Their components and their interrelationships 
often change in a very short time frame, rendering initial efforts to understand 
them obsolete—especially in war, which we understand as a complex interac-
tive system. This was the case in November–December 1950 in Korea. Both the 
operational situation and understanding of that situation changed rapidly. The 
Navy’s practical challenge was to ascertain what rapidly changing conditions on 
the ground and successive decisions by MacArthur and his principal ground 
commanders would demand of it for support.21
The learning curve for ill-structured problems is generally very steep, and trial 
and error constitute the main mechanism for generating information and reduc-
ing uncertainty about the problem—that is, converting it into a well-structured 
one. Notably, the centralized, hierarchical organization structures effective for 
well-structured problems do not fit ill-structured ones, which are more readily 
addressed by decentralized, self-organizing systems, within which discretion re-
sides at many points. Such systems allow experts to exercise their best judgment, 
adjusting as required, while achieving unity of effort principally through lateral 
communications.22 Even then, the most that can be attained in real time is to ren-
der such problems well structured in the small, while the larger problem remains 
ill structured.23 The structure of the overall problem will likely only be known in 
retrospect, after its attempted solution. 
Although no name for the concept had yet been coined, Rear Admiral Doyle 
implicitly grasped the challenges posed by an ill-structured problem and the rela-
tionship between type of problem and the command-and-control (C2, in today’s 
shorthand) relations that would be appropriate. He proceeded accordingly.
Doyle realized that the unprecedented character of the potential problem 
of extracting large numbers of troops and amounts of equipment from widely 
separated hostile beaches on two coasts dictated against a programmed, standard 
C2 structure below. As Commander, Task Force (CTF) 90, he had at his disposal 
Amphibious Groups 1 and 3. Facing the prospect of simultaneous retrograde 
movements by Eighth Army on the west coast and by X Corps on the east, Doyle 
retained overall command of the redeployments but directed Amphibious Group 
3, under Rear Admiral Lyman Thackrey, to attend to Eighth Army at Chinnampo 
and Inchon, leaving Amphibious Group 1, under his direct command, to support 
X Corps at Songjin, Wonsan, and Hungnam.
At MacArthur’s request, Amphibious Group 1, under Doyle, had arrived in 
Japan in early June 1950 to train Eighth Army in battalion-level amphibious op-
erations. The day North Korea attacked, it was conducting a landing exercise at 
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Sagami Wan. Initially little more than a token training unit, during the months 
preceding Hungnam the group grew many times over to become a full-fledged 
amphibious force.
Doyle was a distinguished veteran amphibious officer, arguably the most 
amphibiously experienced serving senior officer. He had been Admiral R. Kelly 
Turner’s operations officer at Guadalcanal, 1942–43, and had then served in 
Admiral Ernest King’s Commander in Chief Amphibious Section, 1943–45, 
including work on the Joint Amphibious Warfare Committee. In early 1948 he 
had assumed command of the Amphibious Training Command at Coronado, 
California; in January 1950 he reported as Commander, Amphibious Group 1.
Officers with extensive World War II amphibious experience populated 
Doyle’s staff. They were overqualified and technically too senior for their billets—
the fortuitous result of a difficult civilian economy and a greatly drawn-down 
Navy. They knew in detail the intricacies of amphibious planning. They were 
used to working together, having experienced little turnover in the preceding 
two years, and had planned and executed three major amphibious exercises in 
the spring of 1950, followed by the three major Korean amphibious operations. 
The admiral knew his staff, its members knew each other, and all had developed 
effective working relationships.
Doyle, in his capacity as CTF 90, had a second capable amphibious force in 
Thackrey’s Amphibious Group 3. It had arrived in Korea shortly following In-
chon. Thackrey had run that port’s operations after its capture and in October 
landed the Army’s 7th Division at Iwon.
Mobile Training Team Able of the Amphibious Training Command’s Troop 
Training Unit had embarked with Amphibious Group 1 when it went to Japan. 
Commanded by Colonel Edward H. Forney, USMC, Team Able’s officers and 
men had worked together for some time and were personally known to Doyle. 
Team Able had been integral to all three previous amphibious operations. Doyle 
had seconded the unit to the 1st Cavalry Division (which lacked amphibious-
experienced personnel) to plan that division’s part in the Pohang Dong landing. 
Doyle then placed the unit on a similar temporary assignment with X Corps for 
the Inchon and Wonsan-Iwon operations; Forney served as the corps’s deputy 
chief of staff. He and his men did the bulk of that command’s amphibious plan-
ning for those operations.24 Thus, Team Able and Amphibious Group 1’s staffs 
were no strangers to each other; neither were Team Able and X Corps staffs 
strangers. Doyle later commented that Forney “could get along with anyone—
and without compromising himself. This facility proved invaluable, for the corps 
commander [Almond] was at best prickly, at worst arrogant and overbearing.”25 
Conversely, Doyle and Major General Smith had quickly developed a close and 
mutually respectful relationship in planning and executing the Inchon and 
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Wonsan-Iwon operations, which was mirrored in the effective working relation-
ships between their staffs (Smith and most of his staff had sailed on board Doyle’s 
flagship for both operations).
Secure in the knowledge that they were seasoned professionals who had 
learned their craft not in peacetime training but in the hard schools of the South-
west and Central Pacific, Mediterranean, and European campaigns of World War 
II, Doyle, as we shall see shortly, would grant his subordinates considerable in-
dependence to make such arrangements for the Hungnam redeployment as their 
professional experience suggested were appropriate. The several elements were 
then to coordinate as required to achieve unity of effort through direct lateral 
communication.
Doyle understood that effectively addressing the problem of amphibious 
withdrawal also required that he be afforded by his own superiors considerable 
leeway in the exercise of command. Shortly after October 1950’s Wonsan-Iwon 
operation, Doyle plainly told his “old and very close friend” Vice Admiral Joy 
that he could not and would not come under the Seventh Fleet commander, Vice 
Admiral Arthur D. Struble, in any future operation. (Figure 1 shows the Naval 
Forces Far East command organization obtaining in November 1950.) Doyle’s 
conflict with Struble, eight years his senior, no doubt had roots in personalities, 
and perhaps in competition for credit, but it extended well beyond into profound 
differences in professional philosophy and practice.26 
For Inchon and Wonsan-Iwon, Doyle had reported directly to Struble. Dur-
ing these operations, Doyle felt, Struble had regularly interfered in his exercise 
of command. Consequently, judging that he needed Doyle’s expertise more than 
Struble’s, Joy issued on 13 November a preliminary plan for evacuation of UN 
forces from Korea that established a naval task organization as shown in figure 
2. It had Doyle reporting directly to him, while granting Doyle considerable dis-
cretion and unusually wide-ranging responsibilities, not only for the redeploy-
ment itself but for shipping protection, control of air support and naval gunfire 
support in the embarkation areas, and maintenance of the blockade along the 
Korean east coast. Joy directed Struble to provide support to Doyle.27 At the same 
time, this unusual arrangement allowed Struble freedom of maneuver and the 
ability to address whatever threats the Soviets and Chinese might pose from the 
sea, either to Doyle’s operations or, in the worst case, to Formosa or Japan. 
Subsequently, however, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral For-
rest Sherman—who believed Hungnam carried potential for great disaster—
intervened. He did not want an amphibious commander to control the fast car-
riers. He was also well aware of continuing friction between Struble (who was his 
protégé) and Doyle. Sherman had previously weighed in with Joy after July 1950’s 
Pohang Dong landing, and as a result the command relations that had obtained 
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for both Inchon and Wonsan-Iwon had been those acceptable to Struble (but 
not to Doyle). For his part, Doyle believed that “Sherman knew little, if anything, 
about amphibious operations”; of his own relationship with the CNO, he later 
commented, “We never were mutual admirers.”28
Sherman directed Admiral Arthur Radford, Commander, Pacific Fleet, to give 
Lieutenant General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Commander, Fleet Marine Forces, Pa-
cific, verbal orders (of which Joy was ultimately made aware) to go to Korea (his 
fifth trip there) and assume command at Hungnam if, in his judgment, Doyle was 
not executing effectively. Doyle learned of Shepherd’s orders only years later.29 
Major General Smith knew only that Shepherd was the CNO’s representative at 
Hungnam.30
In the end, however, Joy’s C2 structure stood, with its great leeway granted 
Doyle to organize and execute the redeployment operations, as well as the forces 
requisite to the job—amphibious shipping, naval gunfire ships, escort-carrier-
based aircraft, and Marine ground-based air. Doyle coordinated additional air 
and naval gunfire support with Struble as needed. Although the Air Force did 
not contribute air-to-ground support to X Corps, it provided night “heckler” 
coverage, and its transports proved essential for evacuating the wounded from 
Chosen Reservoir.31
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ACCELERATING EVENTS ON THE GROUND
On 28 November Joy alerted Doyle to the high probability of major evacuation 
operations. Doyle immediately commenced planning for “redeployment by water 
of own and friendly troops in Korea either as an administrative ‘outloading’ or 
a general emergency based on Joy’s OpPlan 116-50.” Joy advised Doyle to put 
his ships, then still in Japan, on six-hour notice for movement to Korea. Doyle 
in turn directed his ships to assemble in Sasebo (a short 165 miles from Pusan) 
and issued Operation Order 19-50 for planning purposes. His basic plan was for 
Amphibious Group 3 to conduct west-coast operations and Amphibious Group 1 
east-coast operations, while overall responsibility remained with Doyle as Com-
mander, Task Force 90.
On 30 November, MacArthur directed X Corps to concentrate in the Hamhung–
Hungnam area, while Eighth Army retired southward to Pyongyang and Seoul. 
Doyle now placed all ships in port on two-hour notice, and Amphibious Group 3 
departed Japan for Inchon. However, Eighth Army’s rapid southward movement 
had already uncovered Chinnampo, necessitating redirection of the group to that 
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port. Late on 3 December the transport group steamed up the eighty-four-mile 
swept channel to Chinnampo, on the assumption that an evacuation was immi-
nent but without specifics on troops and equipment to be extracted, the tactical 
situation, or even who was to command the operation.
Fortunately, Thackrey discovered that shipping already in place at Chin-
nampo was adequate to requirements. He had extracted 1,800 Army and Navy 
port personnel and 5,900 ROK troops, along with civilian refugees who showed 
up unannounced, by late 4 December.32 At Inchon, from 7 December to 5 Janu-
ary, when the port was closed and destroyed even as Chinese troops entered the 
city, Thackrey outloaded 4,693 UN and 63,220 Korean military personnel, 1,404 
vehicles, and 62,144 tons of cargo, along with 64,200 Korean civilians, all subse-
quently landed at Pusan.33
For the moment, it remained unclear whether United Nations forces would 
have to withdraw entirely from Korea to Japan or could and would maintain 
lodgments at Pusan and Hungnam throughout the winter. However, on 1 De-
cember the Joint Chiefs of Staff instructed MacArthur to withdraw X Corps and 
“coordinate” that movement with Eighth Army, which was to hold its position 
across the waist of Korea. On 7 December high-level discussions in Tokyo modi-
fied that plan to have Eighth Army hold Seoul until it became necessary to retire 
upon Pusan.34 The following day, when the senior Navy and Marine commanders 
conferred on board Doyle’s flagship, they still had to consider two possibilities: 
that of establishing and maintaining a lodgment at Hungnam and the more likely 
one of withdrawal. Fortunately, the next day the Joint Chiefs approved the revised 
plan, and the decision was made to redeploy south.
Such fluidity does not conduce to easy operational planning, but Doyle and 
his staff met the challenge, having preliminary plans already in hand both for de-
fending a perimeter at Hungnam and for withdrawing from that port, as well as 
from other east- and west-coast ports. Now they knew they would be executing a 
withdrawal: “Troops and supplies that had reached the theater through three ports 
and troops that had arrived overland now had to be funneled out through a single 
harbor; personnel and gear that had come in over a period of two months were to 
be removed in the space of two weeks.”35 At the same time, the amphibious forces 
had to continue unloading supplies required by the withdrawing troops and those 
supplies necessary to the defense of the perimeter around Hungnam.
Doyle and his staff initially made the analogy between the operant conditions 
of the redeployment problem and an “amphibious landing in reverse.” Suppose 
one filmed an amphibious assault and then ran it backward—what would the 
operation look like? It proved an apt connection and provided the starting point 
(but only that) for imposing a structure on the problem and devising a course of 
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action for its solution. Doyle decided that excess supplies and supporting troops 
would embark first; thereafter, as the beachhead shrank with the embarkation of 
combat forces, naval gunfire and air support would ensure that there was no dim-
inution of combat power ashore. At the conclusion, naval bombardment would 
be the only force “ashore.”36 Doyle had previously commenced mine clearance at 
Hungnam to expand the safe anchorage area, provide an expanded safe channel 
from the anchorage to seaward, and establish channels for gunfire-support ships.
On 1 December X Corps reported that 3rd Infantry Division at Wonsan was 
under heavy enemy pressure and that road and rail lines between there and 
Hungnam had been cut, and it requested an amphibious redeployment of the 
division. Doyle decided to conduct this initial evacuation as a small-scale test 
of his tentative plans and procedures for Hungnam. It would illuminate the 
strengths and weaknesses of the proposed staged reduction of the defense pe-
rimeter around the Hungnam harbor—in effect, telling him whether or not he 
had gotten about right the structure of the problem. In the event, at Wonsan the 
evacuation plan was simple and direct. The troops ashore described around the city 
an arc whose radius they progressively reduced as supplies and personnel within the 
beachhead loaded and left. The fire support ships isolated Wonsan by shellfire, fired 
any observed missions [i.e., spotted by controllers, in observation aircraft] requested, 
and at night provided random harassing and interdiction fires on pre-selected targets 
and fired star shells for battlefield illumination.37
Fortunately, it was already clear when Doyle arrived at Wonsan on 4 December 
that there was no significant enemy pressure and that all but the rear elements of 
3rd Division had already moved by road to Hungnam. Consequently, he revised 
lift requirements downward. Ultimately, 3,800 3rd Division troops, seven thou-
sand refugees, 1,146 vehicles, and ten thousand tons of cargo outloaded by ship 
from Wonsan from 3 to 5 December.
The experiment validated Doyle’s initial hypothesis, and his staff began pre-
paring detailed plans for Hungnam based on lessons learned there. Subordinate 
units proceeded simultaneously in their own planning, communicating continu-
ally with Doyle and his staff, who remained on board his flagship, USS Mount 
McKinley (AGC 7), anchored in Hungnam harbor. On 6 December, Doyle sent a 
small force from Wonsan to lift ROK I Corps from Songjin to Hungnam. Opera-
tions at Songjin closed out on 10 December.
ORGANIZATION AT HUNGNAM
As map 2 indicates, Hungnam was well suited to serve as the principal port for 
the redeployment. As one historian describes it, the
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city of Hungnam, manufacturing center as well as seaport, lies in the northwestern 
corner of the Korean Gulf near the delta of the Songchon River. Although Hamhung, 
its inland satellite, is an important road and railway center, Hungnam is the larger of 
the two, with a population in 1950 a third again that of Wonsan. The bay on which 
the city lies is open to the south, but the inner harbor is protected by a 2,200-foot 
wharf with four fathoms of water and by a breakwater. Other smaller wharves ex-
isted, as did heavy loading equipment, developed to handle the products of the city’s 
chemical industry. As at Wonsan, a 100-fathom curve runs 30 miles offshore and the 
approaches are easily mined.38
In addition to the inner port facilities, shown in map 3, which would allow ef-
fective employment of standard cargo and transport shipping, Hungnam possess-
es beaches immediately adjacent to the port, shown in map 4, that were entirely 
suitable in their hydrography for beaching amphibious shipping and were readily 
defensible within the planned perimeter. Nearby Yongpo Airfield (see maps 2 and 
4) served as the primary base for the 1st Marine Air Wing, which was to provide a 
major portion of the close air support and combat air patrol. Equally important, 
X Corps headquarters had been established and remained at Hamhung, facilitat-
ing easy communication between the ground commander and the amphibious 
commander and their staffs.39 Moreover, in order to facilitate the logistic support 
MAP 2
Field, History of United States Naval Operations.
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of X Corps, beginning on 7 November the Navy had addressed the Soviet-laid 
mines at Hungnam, declaring the port open four days later. Thus, the port was 
well located, suitable to the endeavor, and for Doyle a known quantity. 
The amphibious group staff held an operations planning conference on board 
Mount McKinley on loading and ship control on the afternoon of 9 December, 
followed by another planning conference ashore with representatives of X Corps 
and the Army 2nd Engineer Special Brigade. Firm plans for loading were made 
during a final staff conference that night and were approved by Doyle. The Con-
trol and Loading Plan, based on a staff study of the harbor’s physical capabilities, 
established a series of control posts, for which a special task organization was 
formed. Doyle assigned to each control station the most able and experienced 
officer and enlisted personnel available from the staffs of CTF 90; the Military Sea 
Transportation Service (MSTS), Hungnam; Fleet Activities, Hungnam; and other 
naval units. “The general experience and ‘know how’ of all hands was utilized to 
the utmost as no one present [had] previous actual experience with an operation 
of this type.”40
The CTF 90 operations section (on board Mount McKinley) constituted one 
of the control stations; it coordinated all ship movements, assigned anchorages, 
issued docking instructions, and prepared and issued sailing orders for all Navy 
and SCAJAP (Shipping Control Authority, Japan) shipping.41 It also supervised 
operations of all other control stations. MSTS activities at Hungnam were in-
tegrated with the operations section on the flagship, with responsibility for all 
MSTS shipping engaged in the operation. Physical colocation facilitated easy, 
close, and clear communication between the two entities.
A radio-equipped harbor-control vessel stationed in the port managed ship-
ping, twenty-four hours a day. An officer boarded each MSTS-operated ship im-
mediately on its arrival to assess its load status, capacity, amount and condition 
of loading equipment, and any peculiarities relevant to loading. This information 
went to CTF 90 Operations by radio. All such ships were directed to be ready for 
movement on immediate, two-hour, or later notice as required. 
On 9 December a X Corps embarkation control group was established to 
provide overall Army supervision of corps loading, with a control officer, an 
executive officer, representatives from each of the corps’s technical services, and 
the CTF 90 staff combat cargo officer as liaison officer. Transient members, as 
required, included embarkation control groups from 1st Marine Division, 7th 
Division, 3rd Division, and ROK I Corps. As during the Inchon and Wonsan-
Iwon landings, Colonel Forney’s Marines did the actual planning for X Corps.
Forney himself served as the shore-based control and loading officer, perform-
ing with “consummate skill.” Set up in a shed on the docks, Forney assigned his 
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officers and enlisted personnel to key positions in this control station, “where 
their four months on the X Corps staff resulted in excellent relationships.” Doyle 
found that General Almond “cooperated fully and ensured that his subordinates 
followed his example. He established X Corps embarkation priority as personnel, 
[then] vehicles, [then] equipment, supplies, and refugees. But he never objected to 
departures from that order, knowing that we had good reason when we did so.”42
Forney and his staff “selected the X Corps units to be loaded on the basis 
of available tactical and administrative information and assigned shipping in 
consultation with the operations section of TF 90. Port operating units were 
then advised of dockside requirements, the loading section ground out its plans, 
the movement section got the traffic down to the water, and the rations people 
laid down these useful items alongside.”43 This control group maintained nearly 
constant direct telephone communication with all relevant units and CTF 90 
Operations.
Each corps unit provided its embarkation control group with a “readiness for 
loading” report (covering personnel, vehicles, and bulk cargo, etc.) prior to its 
MAP 3
U.S. Navy
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time to commence loading as promulgated in the master schedule, which hinged 
on the tactical situation. X Corps broke the report data into shipping require-
ments, as advised by the combat cargo officer. CTF 90 Operations assigned suit-
able shipping, on the basis of these requirements and available berths. The em-
barkation control group was provided the identities of the ships assigned, along 
with data on their capacity, booms, etc., and planned a “paper load.” Shortages 
and overages of shipping space were immediately reported to CTF 90 Operations, 
and the embarkation control group adjusted plans as necessary.
The port director maintained operational control of actual docking and un-
docking of all ships and of the movement of all shipping in the inner harbor. 
Three qualified CTF 90 staff officers were assigned to Port Director Control. A 
radio-equipped landing craft assigned to the port director (and shared with the 
beachmaster, described below) served as a dispatch boat. Ships moored at one of 
seven berthing spaces alongside four docks. Experimentation quickly led to pro-
cedures for the most efficient use of these limited spaces (including, importantly, 
double-banking ships at the docks). Two radio-equipped Army yard tugs made 
it possible to dock and undock ships rapidly.44 
CTF 90 Operations advised the port director that a given ship was to be 
docked at a given berth as a replacement for the ship there, then directed it to 
proceed from its anchorage and wait in the vicinity of the breakwater for a pilot, 
who docked the ship. Doyle and his staff contrived so to “time the process that 
the new ship reached her berth at the same time the first troops and supplies to 
be loaded came alongside,” and they usually met that goal.45 The embarkation 
control liaison officer advised CTF 90 Operations of the time a given ship would 
finish loading, and the latter assigned it a “chop time” that was given to the port 
director. At that time the ship was undocked and got under way.
The Beachmaster Control Unit controlled beaching and retracting all tank 
landing ships (LSTs) in the LST beaching area (Green Beaches 1 and 2; see map 
4), a function analogous to that of the port director. An MSTS officer with a 
great deal of previous LST experience, assigned as beachmaster, piloted most of 
the SCAJAP LSTs onto the beach (where they would open their bow doors, drop 
a ramp, and “onload” vehicles and cargo directly, backing off the beach, with the 
help of an anchor dropped astern, when ready). The beaching area could handle 
eleven LSTs simultaneously; additionally, three LSTs could be berthed at Dock 
No. 4 when the Green Beaches were full, or immediately adjacent to that dock 
at Blue Beach. CTF 90 Operations delivered sailing orders to each LST before it 
was loaded. Once the Shore Party (below) notified the beachmaster that an LST 
was loaded, the latter forwarded that information to the CTF 90 liaison officer 
at X Corps headquarters by radio. The liaison officer then obtained final clear-
ance for sailing and in turn informed the beachmaster, who directed the LST to 
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execute its sailing orders (and assisted, with boats, in its retraction from the beach 
if required). Additional assistance was provided by a SCAJAP headquarters staff 
officer temporarily assigned to CTF 90 Operations. 
A control officer and small staff (on board the Control Ship) directed move-
ment of all utility landing ships (LSUs) and smaller craft in the inner harbor. The 
control officer also assisted in directing movements of the LSTs, in coordination 
with the beachmaster and the port director. This was a busy station, twenty-four 
hours a day. 
Doyle assigned his staff civil engineer to the Army 2nd Engineer Special Bri-
gade, which served as the Shore Party—responsible for physical aspects of the 
loading. The civil engineer liaison officer advised the brigade in order to expedite 
loading and kept CTF 90 Operations informed of loading progress in real time. 
Doyle later commented that this “Liaison Officer solved any problems which 
arose and was extremely valuable as an ‘expediter’ who had direct contact with all 
Army and Navy Control Stations connected with the operation.”46 
Hundreds of aviation gasoline drums await evacuation on the Hungnam docks, 14 December 1950. USS LST-898 is in the center, with a LCU at right and the 
harbor entrance control frigate (PF) in the background. View looking northeast from Blue Beach across the inner harbor.
U.S. Navy
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Each control element worked independently on those matters that it could 
handle without reference to the other elements and coordinated with the others 
when required. However, given the extremely compressed time frame, the discre-
tion Doyle granted his subordinates would have been for naught absent a simple, 
effective, real-time communications system: the admiral believed that “the most 
important factor in the operation of the control organization was the establish-
ment of special primary and secondary very-high-frequency voice radio circuits 
directly connecting Control Stations.” All stations used the primary circuit except 
the station manned by the CTF 90 liaison officer at the X Corps embarkation 
control group, who had near-exclusive use of the secondary circuit. Ultimately, 
however, both circuits were used whenever necessary due to difficulties in com-
munication. A simple numerical code was employed to identify ships easily and 
still maintain security.
Qualified operators served on each station on both circuits, but in order to 
eliminate delay or misunderstanding in operational traffic, “all except routine 
messages of minor importance were transmitted by the officers concerned speaking 
directly to each other.”47 Officers spoke directly to other officers and therefore 
A truck convoy moves along a beach road to the evacuation beach, 18 December 1950. Two Japanese-manned LSTs and USS LSM-419 are loading.
U.S. Navy
24
Naval War College Review, Vol. 65 [2012], No. 2, Art. 8
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss2/8
 C H I S H O L M  129
solved problems, kept everyone concerned informed, made or obtained deci-
sions rapidly, and issued orders in the most efficient manner possible under the 
circumstances.
In the harbor, CTF 90 Operations primarily used visual signals (flag hoist and 
flashing light) to handle administrative traffic and to communicate with MSTS 
ships present. During 7–24 December, Mount McKinley’s signal bridge handled 
1,124 outgoing and 1,104 incoming dispatches. Overall, 44,750 dispatches were 
handled on the flagship during the period, including 24,630 on the tactical cir-
cuits and 17,982 in Radio One (the ship’s “radio shack”). Such communications 
arrangements permitted ready adjustment and adaptation as circumstances 
changed and as new, unanticipated problems arose. At the same time, individual 
control posts were not overburdened with information they did not require to 
conduct their activities.
“WALK, DON’T RUN TO THE NEAREST EXIT”
Because the outloading could function smoothly without Doyle’s direct supervi-
sion, he was able to focus on “preventing the enemy from establishing itself close 
Amphibious shipping beached at Hungnam during the evacuation, December 1950. LCUs present include LCU-520, LCU-638, LCU-742, & LCU-783.
U.S. Navy
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enough to our troops to cause casualties. To that end [he] used air attacks and 
naval gunfire to maintain the necessary separation. Basically, [he] put in front of 
the U.N. units a zone of fire through which the enemy could not pass.”48 
Doyle directly controlled the naval gunfire support element. From 7 to 15 De-
cember he stationed ships of this element where, as shown on map 2, they could 
simultaneously deliver emergency “call fire” (that is, requested by troops without 
notice) for X Corps and defend local shipping against enemy air attack. On 15 
December, stationed in the assigned mineswept channels (extending ten miles 
north and south of Hungnam), the ships of the element began deep-support 
fires (while X Corps artillery provided close support)—principally eight-inch 
interdiction and harassing fires and five-inch illumination rounds (enemy 
forces tended to press on friendly lines at night). As the perimeter contracted, 
the gunfire support ships moved to closer stations as required for direct troop 
support. Both observation and fighter aircraft located targets of opportunity and 
supplemented ground observation. Missouri (BB 63) arrived at Hungnam on 24 
December to provide additional fire.49
The 1st Marine Air Wing at Yongpo Airfield (see maps 2 and 4) provided air 
support during the initial phase of the operation. It controlled all air support 
(including carrier-based) and served as the tactical air control center until 15 
December, when Yongpo was uncovered by the contracting perimeter and it was 
flown out. The center moved to Mount McKinley, and CTF 90 assumed control 
of all air support within a thirty-five-mile radius of Hungnam, including TF 77 
aircraft and Task Group (TG) 96.8 escort carrier aircraft, night hecklers from the 
Air Force and TF 77, and all reconnaissance and transient aircraft (see figure 2).
Throughout, Marine pilots in observation aircraft provided forward air control
—they “understood the requirements of the troops and the capabilities of the 
covering aircraft and their armament loads.”50 Detachments from the Marine Air 
and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO) served with X Corps Army 
units to maintain radio contact with the forward air controllers, supporting air-
craft, and naval gunfire ships—the “ANGLICO’s had the expertise necessary to 
call for and control the available support.”51 At sea, under TF 77, there were never 
fewer than four Essex-class carriers to provide air support, coordinated by CTF 
90 Operations with CTF 77, as for the July 1950 Pohang Dong landing. Doyle 
handled air and naval gunfire communications in the manner prescribed for as-
sault amphibious operations.
Doyle also shifted from shore-based to seaborne logistics, using floating petro-
leum and ammunition dumps, along with an evacuation center and a prisoner-
of-war camp afloat. He ordered life jackets and debarkation ladders. He directed 
Thackrey to send all available attack transports and attack cargo ships (along with 
26
Naval War College Review, Vol. 65 [2012], No. 2, Art. 8
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss2/8
 C H I S H O L M  131
one dock landing ship, or LSD) from Inchon to Hungnam and requested that Joy 
provide ten empty cargo ships daily at Hungnam until further notice.52
Doyle published his loading and control plan for Hungnam on 11 December. 
He issued Operation Order 20-50 on 13 December, incorporating his Operation 
Order 19-50 and consolidating previous dispatches. Plans for gunfire support 
and air support were finalized in coordination with the TF 77 operations offi-
cer, X Corps, and Commander, Cruiser Division 1.53 Operations would proceed 
twenty-four hours per day.
That same day, Doyle assumed direct command of Hungnam port functions 
and commenced loading X Corps personnel, vehicles, and supplies. General Al-
mond had proposed that the 1st Marine Division provide security for the opera-
tion. However, because the Marines had already borne the hardest fighting, Doyle 
insisted that they load first, while the 3rd Division supplied security, with the 7th 
Division taking over portions of the perimeter until the ROK I Corps cleared the 
port; then the last U.S. division would embark.54
The operation continued to present surprises. Doyle’s staff had initially esti-
mated, for example, based on Wonsan, that lift would be required for twenty-five 
thousand refugees. The number evacuated grew to almost four times that num-
ber. Aside from the shipping they required, the refugees had to be fed and kept 
warm while awaiting embarkation. Similarly, when the redeployment order was 
received 9 December, ships were still unloading supplies; some of the supplies 
were required to maintain the defensive perimeter, and the necessity for unload-
ing them tied up some port facilities for several days. Doyle halted unloading 
when possible, but then his loading officer had to devise loading plans for ships 
that were not empty at the outset. 
The 12th showed a marked acceleration of the loading operations. By the next 
day, 55 percent of the personnel, 40 percent of the vehicles, and 70 percent of the 
bulk cargo of the Marines had been loaded. Doyle finalized plans for lifting the 
ROK I Corps from Hungnam to Samchok, as requested by X Corps. The corps 
had estimated a requirement for twelve thousand personnel and “a few vehicles,” 
and accordingly three ships had been committed. However, X Corps continued 
to revise the lift requirements upward—now twenty-five thousand personnel, 
seven hundred vehicles (including four hundred two-and-a-half-ton trucks), fifty 
tractors, and other heavy equipment. Consequently, additional shipping was al-
located. Intelligence studies and aerial reconnaissance on 13 December led to the 
selection of Bokuko Ko as the landing site for the Korean units. Doyle formed TG 
90.8 for that purpose on 16 December. It departed for Bokuko Ko on 17 Decem-
ber and commenced disembarking the following day. Meanwhile, by the 14th, 90 
percent of the Marines’ personnel, 95 percent of their vehicles, and 97 percent of 
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their bulk cargo had been loaded. The division sailed for Pusan the following day, 
and the 7th Division commenced loading. 
Loading continued on the 17th, amid forty-knot winds, heavy seas, and freez-
ing temperatures. Ships dragged anchor, and small boats drifted loose in and out 
of the harbor. Winds reached sixty knots in the open sea, and all carrier flight op-
erations were suspended.55 At 1600 (four o’clock in the afternoon) on 19 Decem-
ber, General Almond embarked on Mount McKinley, and command of all shore 
operations, including defense of the perimeter, passed to Doyle. The admiral 
pointedly told the general, so that there could be no mistake, “You understand . . . 
that these troops are now under my command.”56 It was precisely the reciprocal 
of the procedure by which during an amphibious assault command passes to the 
ground commander once he has established his command post ashore and so 
notified the amphibious commander. At the same time, 3rd Division took over 
the ground defenses.
By 20 December Doyle was confident enough of the operation’s trajectory to 
set the 24th as the tentative “reverse” D-day—or “Dog Day,” as it was then known. 
On the 20th, 7th Division completed loading and 3rd Division commenced 
loading. By the 22nd it emerged that sufficient shipping was available to outload 
another four thousand tons of ammunition and thirteen railroad boxcars (South 
Korea desperately needed rolling stock). Instructions for the Dog Day embarka-
tion were completed and distributed. On the 23rd, additional refugees went on 
board U.S. ships, and Missouri reported to its assigned fire support station. Doyle 
informed the beachmaster of prospective movements and the beaching sequence 
of LSTs and LSUs on Dog Day. For the final withdrawal, Doyle maintained a na-
val gunfire barrage in a zone 2,500 yards wide about three thousand yards from 
the beaches and harbor. Call fires in addition to this barrage prevented enemy 
movement through the zone during the day. Doyle ordered the port director to 
commence undocking all ships at the quays at 2000 (8 PM) and increased harass-
ing fire from naval gunfire support ships. When the last friendly troops were off 
the beaches, destructive fires rained down on the port area. Particular attention 
was given the destruction of the remaining railroad cars.57 Hungnam port closed 
at 2300. The beaches remained to be cleared the next day.
Early on the day of Christmas Eve, Doyle confirmed H-hour as 1100 (11 AM). 
Simultaneously, aircraft napalmed a hundred to three hundred enemy troops 
who had begun to press on the perimeter. As shown on map 4, the perimeter 
was progressively and rapidly reduced until at 1100 initial combat elements, less 
the covering forces, commenced loading into the LSTs and LSUs. At 1217, Army 
personnel prematurely detonated two Pink Beach ammunition dumps, causing 
loss of personnel and boats. By 1405, friendly forces had cleared all beaches. Five 
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minutes later, demolition charges were detonated around the waterfront of the 
inner harbor. At 1457, the hospital ship Consolation (AH 15) got under way, and 
the general sortie from the harbor commenced. Mount McKinley departed at 
1632, and the operation concluded. Not a single friendly had been left behind.58 
{LINE-SPACE} 
In the end, the Chinese and North Koreans elected not to attempt any serious 
interference with operations at Hungnam—in part, because the 1st Marine Di-
vision and Navy and Marine air had combined with Old Man Winter to render 
their forces substantially ineffective, and also, no doubt, because they understood 
that “their losses would certainly have been greater than they could have hoped 
to inflict. Fire power from the sea would have dwarfed what they had already 
absorbed during their attack on the Marines at Chosen.”59 More ammunition 
was ultimately expended at Hungnam than at the Inchon landing—but then, the 
operation lasted much longer, plenty of ammunition was available, and as Doyle 
later pointed out, powder and metal were much less valuable than human life.60
USS LSMR-404 and USS Begor (APD-127) stand by as U.N. troops demolish the Hungnam port facilities at the end of the evacuation, on 24 December 1950.
U.S. Navy
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During fourteen days at Hungnam, the U.S. Navy embarked and redeployed 
105,000 troops, 17,500 vehicles, and 350,000 measurement tons of supplies (in-
cluding fuel and ammunition stores). It also lifted 91,000 civilian refugees to safety
—a number limited only by time and available shipping. Marine and Air Force 
air transports flew out an additional 3,600 troops, 196 vehicles, and 1,300 tons of 
cargo. The number and types of ships employed reveal the operation’s magnitude 
and complexity: one amphibious command ship (AGC), three attack transports, 
three attack cargo ships, eight MSTS-operated transports and one MSTS cargo 
ship, five heavy-lift time-charter vessels, fifty-one regular time-charter vessels 
(Victory ships), two SCAJAP time-charter vessels, eleven U.S. Navy LSTs, twenty-
six SCAJAP LSTs, and three LSDs. Most vessels made multiple trips in and out of 
Hungnam; for example, thirty-seven LSTs made a total of eighty-one trips. 
A DECENTRALIZED, SELF-ORGANIZING SYSTEM 
Doyle later commented that the command relationships and operational proce-
dures for Hungnam were unique to that special situation and probably ought not 
Koreans prepare to board an LST during the Hungnam evacuation, 19 December 1950. Other Koreans are transferring their belongings from an ox cart to a 
fishing boat, at left. Taken on Green Beach.
U.S. Navy
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to be used as a template for future amphibious operations. Insofar as the prin-
cipal factors (and their interrelationships) of future operations were not largely 
identical to those that obtained at Hungnam, the admiral was absolutely correct. 
At another level, however, the admiral was quite wrong and altogether too 
modest. The key to the remarkable military feat at Hungnam resided in Doyle’s 
implicit recognition that, however experienced they were in amphibious opera-
tions, he and his staff had never before encountered a problem even remotely 
resembling that presented by Hungnam, nor did amphibious doctrine provide 
any foundation. That is, he and his staff correctly assessed that they faced an ill-
structured problem—although they did not have that name for it.
Doyle’s decision to devise an ad hoc plan and C2 organization predicated on 
the analogy of an amphibious operation executed in reverse therefore proved 
pivotal. That approach allowed experts to exercise their professional judgment 
freely in their areas of responsibility, to impose structure on the problems each 
confronted and generate solutions for them, and to communicate informally, 
directly, and quickly with others whose advice, cooperation, and coordination 
were necessary. Doyle essentially established and maintained a decentralized, 
self-organizing system that proved highly adaptive and flexible, well suited to the 
primary constraint on the operation—time. Experimentation and rapid learning, 
inevitably essential to the solution of ill-structured problems, were the rule, not 
conformity to preconceived notions of doctrine and to military formalities. Even 
the plan and organization themselves resulted from unusually consultative staff 
planning conferences that facilitated input from those with the requisite exper-
tise. The profound lesson of Hungnam is to be found in the manner in which the 
operation was approached and organized.
UN control of adjacent sea and air enabled Doyle the complete freedom of 
action sought by every commander but rarely attained by any. The responsible 
naval commanders correctly understood that they could hold a perimeter at 
Hungnam as long as they wished to do so, given established and sustainable con-
trol of the sea and air, and the ready availability of naval air and gunfire support. 
This allowed United Nations forces to control the timing and completion of a 
well organized and well executed extraction. Conversely, the enemy was limited 
to ground action only, and that by an already attrited force without the heavy 
weapons to threaten seriously the redeploying forces.61
That historians and the popular imagination have heretofore focused on the 
Inchon landing is understandable (after all, it was an audacious assault, while 
Hungnam was a withdrawal) but unfortunate. Although the decision to land at 
Inchon was a difficult and daring one and succeeded operationally and tactically, 
it presented no particular novelties to Doyle and his amphibious experts. Mac-
Arthur’s insistence on Inchon may have violated their professional sensibilities, 
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but they possessed both doctrine and experience by which to act effectively.62 By 
contrast, Hungnam presented novelty at almost every turn, and yet the amphibi-
ous group rose to the occasion.
Doyle’s ability to emplace a self-organizing system at Hungnam was predicat-
ed on the granting by Vice Admiral Joy of his demand that unlike in the Inchon 
and Wonsan operations, he be permitted to exercise command independently of 
the Seventh Fleet commander. Joy acceded because of his long-standing profes-
sional and personal relationship with Doyle and his practical understanding that 
amphibious expertise was the factor critical to success at Hungnam. Notwith-
standing his own misgivings about Joy’s decision, the CNO was unwilling or 
unable to overturn it directly, and his subterfuge of sending a “representative” to 
Hungnam had, in the event, no effect. For his part, Admiral Struble of Seventh 
Fleet, for whom Joy’s decision must have been a bitter pill, responded fully to 
Doyle’s requests for air and naval gunfire support and at the same time was able 
to focus on his broader Seventh Fleet responsibilities. Similarly, the presence of a 
second fully capable amphibious group in Korea under Doyle meant that Doyle 
could allocate responsibility for west-coast redeployment operations to that 
group, freeing himself from their detailed supervision and allowing him and his 
staff to focus on Hungnam.
Several other factors also contributed both to Doyle’s willingness to employ 
a self-organizing system and to its success. His initial amphibious operational 
experience was as operations officer at Guadalcanal. Because such an operation 
had never before been attempted, it constituted an ill-structured problem, un-
like later operations in the Central Pacific, which were much better structured.63 
Subsequently, Doyle served for two years in Admiral King’s amphibious planning 
section. He thereby had firsthand experience with the practical matters of dealing 
with ill-structured problems and the need for an adaptable and self-organizing 
C2 organization.
Doyle’s staff comprised entirely officers with extensive World War II amphibi-
ous experience, men who were virtually all overqualified for their billets. The 
same obtained for the officers and men of Forney’s Mobile Training Team Able. 
Doyle’s staff was no ordinary collection of skilled individual officers. Rather, it 
had seen little turnover and had worked together on landing exercises both state-
side and in Japan prior to planning and conducting the Pohang Dong, Inchon, 
and Wonsan landings, along with myriad lesser amphibious lifts. In consequence, 
Doyle knew his staff members (and those of Team Able) personally and profes-
sionally in detail; the staff members knew each other in like manner, and they had 
evolved effective working relationships. Experience at Inchon and Wonsan had 
also established effective working relationships also with the principal ground 
commanders and their staffs. These factors all conduced to the development and 
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maintenance of trust among the key participants. These men could be depended 
on to do their jobs without central direction and to improvise when required. 
Underlying all of this was an effective communications system at Hungnam that 
permitted ready lateral coordination among the control posts.
In the end, the worst fears of the military commanders in Korea and of the 
American popular press were not realized in December 1950. Hungnam was no 
Dunkirk, nor from the Navy and the Marine Corps perspective had it at any time 
been likely to become one. Many factors contributed to success in Hungnam, 
including the availability of specialized amphibious shipping and complete 
control of air and sea, but the defining factors were the presence of experienced 
professionals, organized effectively, and the willingness of their commander to 
let them do their jobs.
{LINE-SPACE} 
After rest and recuperation at the “Bean Patch,” near Ulsan, 1st Marine Division, 
still part of X Corps but the latter now integrated with Eighth Army, was ordered 
out of Army reserve on 9 January 1951 to reenter the fight. The Army’s 3rd and 
7th Divisions followed close behind.
In spring 1951, Rear Admiral Doyle returned to the United States for a well 
deserved rest and new duties. In September that year he became president of 
the Board of Inspection and Survey, serving until the following May, when he 
assumed the chairmanship of the Joint Amphibious Board. Doyle retired in No-
vember 1953, in the grade of vice admiral on the retired list, on the basis of his 
combat awards. He practiced law for many years in Austin, Texas, and died in 1982.
His work on the Joint Amphibious Board, rewriting existing doctrine for am-
phibious operations (then embodied in Naval Warfare Publication 22), proved, 
in the aftermath of the defense unification battles, highly contentious. The board 
completed its work at the end of Doyle’s tenure, publishing its report in January 
1954. The report set forth divergent service views on “doctrines and procedures 
governing joint amphibious operations” that were delaying finalization of a 
jointly acceptable solution—each page was divided into thirds, with the views of 
the Navy and Marine Corps, Army, and Air Force for each issue given separately. 
Curiously, given its chairman’s immediate past experience at Hungnam, the re-
port addressed only the problems of the assault, primarily matters of phasing and 
of command and control.64 
Today, joint doctrine, although entirely consistent with the lessons of Hungnam, 
provides only minimal guidance for structuring the problem of the amphibious 
withdrawal. Naval commanders and staffs not already well practiced in the am-
phibious assault will find only a very rough outline for approaching the problem 
of the amphibious withdrawal. They are better advised to study Hungnam and its 
many relatives systematically, to consult the superseded Joint Publication 3-02.1, 
33
Chisholm: A Remarkable Military Feat: The Hungnam Redeployment, December 19
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2012
 138  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
The author thanks Capt. James Cook, USN 
(Ret.), and his colleagues in the Joint Military 
Operations Department of the Naval War 
College for their thoughtful comments on 
earlier drafts. 
1. The title refers to a 21 December 1950 mes-
sage (date-time group 210836Z) from Vice 
Adm. C. Turner Joy, Commander, Naval 
Forces Far East, to the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions, Adm. Forrest Sherman, and Com-
mander, Pacific Fleet, Adm. Arthur Radford, 
in reference to the Hungnam operation: 
“Doyle with Struble’s excellent air cover and 
complete support is performing remarkable 
military feat in withdrawal plan [sic] army 
with all of their equipment and without 
heavy losses” [emphasis supplied]; U.S. 
Navy Operational Archives, Naval History 
and Heritage Command, Washington, D.C. 
[hereafter Navy Operational Archives]. The 
epigraphs are as quoted from the original 
sources in Michael Duffy, “Festering the 
Spanish Ulcer: The Royal Navy and the Pen-
insular War, 1808–1814,” in Naval Power and 
Expeditionary Warfare: Peripheral Campaigns 
and New Theaters of Naval Warfare, ed. Bruce 
A. Elleman and S. C. M. Paine (London: 
Routledge, 2011), pp. 15–28. The epigraphs: 
from Molyneux’s Conjunct Expeditions: or, 
expeditions that have been carried on jointly by 
the fleet and army, with a commentary on a lit-
toral war (1759); an observation by Wellesley 
(later Lord Wellington) on his 1808–1809 
Peninsular Campaign.
2. U.S. Defense Dept., Amphibious Operations, 
Joint Publication 3-02 (Washington, D.C.: 
Joint Staff, 10 August 2009) [hereafter JP 
3-02], p. xi, available at Defense Technical 
Information Center, Joint Electronic Library, 
www.dtic.mil/doctrine/.
3. The National Defense Program: Unification 
and Strategy: Hearings before the U.S. House 
of Representatives Committee on the Armed 
Services, 81st Cong., 1st sess. (October 1949) 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Print-
ing Office [hereafter GPO], 1949), p. 521. 
Strictly speaking, as has been pointed out, the 
general was correct: massive over-the-beach 
assaults against strong enemy defenses, such 
as those at Sicily and Normandy, have not 
been, and are not likely to be, practiced by 
the U.S. military—although one suspects that 
they just might be by other nations perhaps 
less chary of high casualty rates. The United 
States has found other ways to skin that cat, 
given developments in improved intelligence, 
vertical-lift capabilities, long-range precision 
fires, and the concept of ship-to-objective 
maneuver; see Keith F. Kopets, “Omar Bradley 
Was Right . . . ,” Marine Corps Gazette (August 
2003), available at www.mca-marines
.org/. One need observe only casually the 
trend of investment by rising powers, such as 
India and China, in amphibious capabilities 
to grasp the continued importance of such 
operations in both peace and war.
4. Recognizing that an entire generation of Navy 
and Marine officers has, after the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, virtually no practical 
experience of amphibious operations, U.S. 
Fleet Forces Command in 2011 conducted 
an amphibious training exercise, BOLD AL-
LIGATOR. Its follow-on, “BA12, tentatively 
scheduled for early in 2012, will be the largest 
amphibious exercise conducted by the Navy 
and Marine Corps in the last ten years. While 
planning is ongoing, it currently includes: An 
Amphibious Task Force (ESG-2) consisting of 
two Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs—7–8 
ships) and a Naval Beach Group (NBG); a 
Marine Expeditionary Brigade–sized Land-
ing Force (2d MEB) consisting of a com-
plete Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), a 
Regimental Landing Team (RLT), a Marine 
Air Group (MAG) and a Combat Logistics 
Regiment (CLR); a Carrier Strike Group 
(CSG—aircraft carrier, carrier air wing, 3–4 
surface combatants); Military Sealift Com-
mand (MSC) ships; Mine Counter-Measures 
Joint Doctrine for Landing Operations, of 2004, and regularly to plan and exercise 
the amphibious withdrawal. The requirement for such does not come along of-
ten, but when it does, fortune will favor the prepared. 
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(MCM) forces; Navy Expeditionary Combat 
Command (NECC) forces; Joint supporting 
forces; and Coalition amphibious, landing, 
and MCM forces.” See “Bold Alligator 2012 
Update,” U.S. Fleet Forces Command Blog (9 
June 2011), usfleetforces.blogspot.com/.
5. JP 3-02, p. xii.
6. See Duffy, “Festering the Spanish Ulcer.” 
7. The data presented in table 1 are drawn 
primarily from Milan N. Vego, Naval Strategy 
and Operations in Narrow Seas (London: 
Frank Cass, 1999), pp. 274–82.
8. Oliver P. Smith to Esther Smith, 14 December 
1950, Oliver P. Smith Papers, U.S. Marine 
Corps Archives, Marine Corps Historical 
Center, Quantico, Va. [hereafter O. P. Smith 
Papers].
9. On 20–22 December, eight soldiers died and 
twelve became severely ill from ingesting 
methyl alcohol. On 24 December, an Army 
captain prematurely detonated an ammu-
nition dump while boats and amphibian 
tractors were still on the beach, killing two 
men and injuring thirty-four; Commander, 
Amphibious Group One (CTF [Commander, 
Task Force] 90), “Report of Operations for 
Period 25 June 1950 to 1 January 1951,” pp. 
39–40, Navy Operational Archives; Oliver P. 
Smith, personal log, entry for 26 December 
1950, p. 123, O. P. Smith Papers. The freighter 
Senzan Maru, carrying fifty thousand 
hundred-pound bags of flour, was mined 
outside Hungnam harbor on 10 December 
but was repaired and sailed to Japan. Enid 
Victory grounded at Hungnam but was 
refloated and sailed to Pusan. A ROK tank 
landing ship (LST) fouled its propellers in 
Manila line and wire. Loaded with more than 
seven thousand civilian refugees, this LST was 
extracted from the beach but remained in the 
harbor overnight while the propellers were 
cleared. A gale came up, during which an 
uncounted number of the refugees on board 
died of exposure; see Walter Karig, Malcolm 
Cagle, and Frank A. Manson, Battle Report, 
vol. 6, The War in Korea (New York: Rinehart, 
1952), pp. 432–33.
10. Of the many published accounts of the 
Chosen withdrawal, see Edwin H. Sim-
mons, Frozen Chosin: The U.S. Marines at 
the Changjin Reservoir (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Marine Corps Historical Center, 2002); 
Gail B. Shisler, For Country and Corps: The 
Life of General Oliver P. Smith (Annapolis, 
Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2009); and Lynn 
Montross and Nicholas A. Canzona, U.S. 
Marine Operations in Korea, 1950–1953, 
vol. 3, The Chosin Reservoir Campaign 
(Washington, D.C.: Historical Branch, G-3, 
Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, 1956). The 
most complete, balanced account of naval 
operations during the Korean War is to be 
found in James A. Field, Jr., History of United 
States Naval Operations, Korea (Washington, 
D.C.: GPO, 1962). See also Malcolm W. Cagle 
and Frank A. Manson, The Sea War in Korea 
(Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1957). 
Both of the latter devote considerable atten-
tion to Hungnam.
11. The author is indebted to Col. Phillip Ridder-
hof, USMC, for providing the unpublished 
essay by Daniel F. Harrington, “Brigadier 
General Edward Hanna Forney, USMC: 
Lessons from the Hungnam Redeployment, 
December 1950—Implications for Opera-
tional Maneuver from the Sea”(student thesis, 
U.S. Army Command and General Staff Col-
lege, Fort Leavenworth, Kans., 1997). Colonel 
Forney, who served as X Corps deputy chief 
of staff for Inchon and Wonsan but made 
his single greatest contribution at Hungnam, 
elected to write only about Inchon. For de-
tails of the Marine personnel running various 
sections of the embarkation control group, 
see Lynn Montross, “The Hungnam Evacu-
ation: Amphibious Operation in Reverse,” 
Marine Corps Gazette (December 1951), pp. 
18–27. (Notably, the Gazette republished 
Montross’s account online in 2010.) Rear 
Adm. James H. Doyle, who commanded at 
Hungnam, never published his version of the 
operation. However, the historian Arthur J. 
Mayer, on the basis of interviews he conduct-
ed with the admiral, composed and published 
a Hungnam account not long before Doyle 
died: James H. Doyle and Arthur J. Mayer, 
“December 1950 at Hungnam,” U.S. Naval 
Institute Proceedings (April 1979), pp. 44–65. 
12. Fleet Adm. Chester W. Nimitz famously said 
to a 1960 Naval War College class that “the 
war with Japan had been re-enacted in the 
game rooms here [Newport] by so many 
people and in so many different ways that 
nothing that happened during the war was 
a surprise—absolutely nothing except the 
kamikaze tactics towards the end of the war.” 
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At a strategic level the admiral was largely 
correct; at the operational and tactical levels, 
however, the Navy had much to learn about 
the planning and execution of amphibious 
assaults.
13. Aside from oblique references passim, JP 
3-02, the current doctrinal publication, de-
votes not quite two full pages to amphibious 
withdrawal. See JP 3-02, pp. III-70 to III-71. 
14. Gen. Douglas MacArthur to Cdr. Malcolm W. 
Cagle, 19 March 1956, Vice Adm. Malcolm 
W. Cagle Papers, box 3, Navy Operational 
Archives [hereafter Cagle Papers].
15. The Soviets had based nearly eighty subma-
rines at Vladivostok, and through five months 
of the war there were more than six dozen 
sightings of unidentified submarines in 
Korean and Japanese waters, of which about 
one-third were confirmed as Soviet boats; 
see “Pacific Fleet Interim Evaluation Report, 
Antisubmarine Operations, 25 June to 15 
November 1950,” Navy Operational Archives. 
However, the Soviets elected not to intervene 
directly, knowing that so doing would risk 
a wider war, of which they wanted no part. 
Nonetheless, the United States took the threat 
seriously, conducting aircraft carrier replen-
ishments some distance from Korea’s east 
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